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Edmund Burke and Adam Smith: Texts in Context   
   
 
    
Burke, Reader of Smith 
 
 
Here is a puzzle I am far from the first to ponder.  Although the Scots 
philosopher Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776) found few insightful 
readers in England before the l790s, Smith himself noted that among what 
early readers he had the Anglo-Irish Whig Member of Parliament Edmund 
Burke stood out (Tribe 1984; Teichgraber, 1985).  Smith informed a 
confidant that Burke “is the only man I ever knew who, without 
communication, thought on economic subjects exactly as I” (West 1969, 
201; Himmelfarb, 1984, 66).  They became correspondents and friends.  But 
while Smith made it clear that government support should be extended in 
hard times to unemployed workers, who have a right to expect it, Burke 
flatly denied it.  “Labor,” he wrote in l795, “is a commodity and as such an 
article of trade” (Burke, 1795, in Kramnick, 1999, 200).  Trade, Burke 
declared, is none of government’s business under any circumstances.  “Of all 
things,” he wrote, “an indiscreet tampering with the trade of provisions is the 
most dangerous and …  always worst … in the time of scarcity” (Burke, 
1795, in Kramnick, 1999, 195).   If anyone deserves relief it is not those who 
are able to work but in hard times can’t find it.  It is those, and only those, 
 2 
who are too sick, infirm, young, or old to work at all.   They do indeed fall 
under our Christian duty to extend charity to the poor (Burke, 1795, in 
Kramnick 203).  But the deserving poor, as they came to be called, are 
objects of our charity only insofar as we, and they, are private persons.  
Government, whose office to “regulate our tempers” by “timely coercion,” 
should stay out of it.  “The people maintain [the government], not they the 
people” (Burke, 1795, in Kramnick, 195) 
The puzzle is simple.  How could Burke be Smith’s best reader if they 
differed on so important a topic? 
I summarize the way scholarship has framed, if not fully answered, 
this problem as follows.  There is, first, the possibility that Burke changed 
his mind without saying so.  In a parliamentary debate in 1795, Samuel 
Whitbread, who seems to have been a pretty good reader of Smith himself, 
cited Smith as urging his colleagues to “regulate the wages of laborers in 
husbandry.”  He was opposed by William Pitt, who cited Smith as an 
authoritative defender of laissez faire.   Burke did not disagree with Pitt.  
Perhaps he, if not Pitt, had already come to understand Smith’s laissez-faire 
principle better than Smith.  Perhaps by 1795 Burke was even anticipating 
Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population, which appeared in l798.  In 
that seminal text, Malthus accused Smith of self-contradiction and argued 
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that public assistance always does more harm than good.   More food equals 
more mouths to feed equals more pressure on food in an inescapable cycle. 1     
 The idea that Burke anticipated Malthus is not unreasonable.  Burke 
and Malthus were both responding to the same rhetorical situation--the 
spread of the so-called “Speenhamland system” of subsidizing families on a 
combined basis of the price of bread and numbers of mouths to feed.  
Initiated at first by local magistrates and adopted nationally as fear of 
French-style revolution by a starving population spread among the 
governing class, Malthus and Burke saw that this system would make things 
worse by creating both dependencies and scarcities.  Still, there is no trace of 
Malthus’s gloomy cyclical “principle” in Burke’s “Thoughts and Details on 
Scarcity.”  Moreover, finding a contradiction in Smith between the new free 
market economy of which he had caught sight and the old ‘moral economy’ 
that, as a professional moral philosopher, kept tugging at his sleeve, seems 
to open up a contradiction in Burke as well.   
The looming contradiction is between Burke’s “organic position on 
political authority and his supposedly ‘liberal’ or individualistic conception 
of economic life” (Winch, 1985, 231) or, put otherwise, between his 
“bourgeois conception of civil society and his aristocratic conception of the 
state” (Freeman, 1980, 216).  As Gertrude Himmelfarb correctly points out, 
                                                 
1
 For the events summarized in this paragraph, see Rothschild, 2001, 61-64. 
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the essence of Burke’s brand of Whiggery was his ideal of organic national 
solidarity (Himmelfarb, 1984, 70).   It led him to reject Locke’s contract 
theory of government and to criticize the executive usurpations of the 
Hanoverian monarchy nearly as strenuously as the American colonists.  In 
fact, Burke was quite sympathetic to the Americans (Burke, 1774).  But can 
national solidarity, on which Burke waxed most eloquently precisely when 
he was most vociferously expressing his categorical opposition to interfering 
with the free market, survive when the government allows its population to 
starve in the streets and die in their hovels?    
I can’t say for sure whether Burke saw pure laissez-faire in Smith 
from the outset or whether he read Smith correctly at first but later re-read 
him in a colder light or whether by the later Burke had more or less given up 
on Smith.  Burke is silent on the subject.  Whatever the answer, my point in 
this essay will be that differences in their economic views are not in any case 
the root cause of Smith’s and Burke’s split on the issue of public assistance.  
They do not disagree about how government is ideally to be related to 
economics.  We find at the very center of the work of each man a shared and 
persistent desire to keep economics radically and fully out the clutches of 
government, and to do for the sake of good government itself.   No, their 
differences spring from divergent conceptions of what a good government is 
and might be.   The difference between Smith’s sober, incipiently republican 
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view of government, I will argue, and Burke’s inability to free himself from 
the sublime display of official violence that, as Michel Foucault has argued, 
characterizes the ancien regime explains most of what needs to be explained 
about their diverging views on the subject of unemployment assistance 
(Foucault, 1975) 
This hypothesis yields, I think, an additional insight.  The felt injustice 
of Burke’s and Malthus’s cold-heartedness played no small role in setting up 
the rhetorical situation in which politicians and economists have been 
immersed ever since.  In the course of reducing the cognitive dissonance 
between the strenuous demands of the free market and the elementary claims 
of distributive justice, we can easily observe how Malthus’s principle that 
population pushes against food was transformed in the first three decades of 
the 19th century from its first expression as a dismal fact about all societies 
into, next, a counter-factual statement about what would happen if markets 
weren’t left free—an interpretation in which Malthus himself took a hand—
and, finally, into a very cheery claim about all the good things that are bound 
to happen for everyone when the market has been left alone.   By the 1830s 
no problem of injustice remained for post-Malthusian “radical” Whig 
utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham (who like Malthus early on accused 
Smith of contradicting himself [Teichgraber, 1985]), James and John Stuart 
Mill, Herbert Spencer, and Harriet Martineau.   Subsequently, the utilitarian 
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solution (which involved both an empirical prediction about economic 
growth and a weaker, consequentialist conception of what morality requires) 
became the basis of the mathematized science of economics that is still very 
much in play in our world.   Given the scientific authority thus conferred on 
economics, the burden of proof has for a very long time been onerously 
placed on leftists like Marx, who thought of Malthus and his followers as 
mere ideologists, and on sentimental paternalists like Dickens, who tried to 
use the imaginative and emotional power of art to revive the claims of 
justice that utilitarian economics was trying to bury.   In the course of this 
transformation of the rhetorical situation Smith was turned into the founder 
of laissez-faire economics, Burke into the father of libertarian conservatism, 
and the complexities of both men’s views forgotten.   
In attempting to recover this complexity, I will read Smith and Burke 
in the context of the different societies, 18th century Scotland and England 
respectively to which, in which, and on behalf of which they wrote.  I will 
also assume a degree of consistency and coherence in their various writings 
that cannot be seen when their economic writings are, in the course of 
“disciplining” their insights, torn out of their larger bodies of work.  I will, 
in short, read Adam Smith and Edmund Burke in the way rhetorical critics 
read works that are deeply engaged in concrete controversies—in context.   
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Adam Smith and the Legend of Adam Smith 
 
If there is one thing that defines a classic text it is that the history of its 
reception is so persistent, powerful, and varied that it renders the original 
opaque and sometimes even inaccessible.  Attempts to find the historical 
Jesus behind the Gospels or Siddhā rtha Gautama behind the Buddha arertha Gautama behind the Bud ha are so 
difficult for this very reason.   This is not nearly as true in the case of Adam 
Smith, but it is true enough.  Smith has been socially constructed since the 
father of laissez-faire capitalism and the Wealth of Nations (1776) as a 
gospel of greed.  But what we learn from carefully reading Smith’s complex 
book, from reading it alongside his several other works, and from placing his 
texts in their Scottish context, is enough to make us wonder whether the 
legend of Adam Smith is even approximately true.   
Consider the famous phrase “invisible hand.”  Smith used it only three 
times.  Its first use, in a text on the history of astronomy from the l750s, 
makes pretty clear reference to the “invisible hand” of darkness that 
Shakespeare’s Macbeth hopes will cover the foul deed he is about to 
perform (Macbeth, Act III, Scene II, Line 49).   As Emma Rothschild points 
out, Smith’s remaining two uses retain a reference to bad intentions while 
pointing to good results that come about in spite of them.  Thus Smith’s 
single mention of the invisible hand in The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
 8 
(1759) refers to the trickle-down effects by which the rich, in spite of their 
congenital vices, give employment, and hence indirectly sustenance, to the 
poor by spending their money on consumption and display (on this passage, 
see McCloskey, 2004, 456-60).  That’s the beauty of a process that can 
properly be viewed only from a wider perspective than that of frivolous 
aristocrats, crooked politicians, or grasping merchants (Rothschild, 2001, 
122).2 
The phrase is also used only once in Wealth of Nations.  It is used 
there to support the trickle-down effects of protecting domestic industries 
and markets, a practice that the real Smith countenanced but that the 
legendary Smith would not.  Here the main point is to rebut the received 
idea, which had long been preached by the Aristotle-influenced medieval 
                                                 
2Rothschild argues that Smith’s wider perspective is that of a self-
consciously cosmopolitan Stoic (Rothschild 2001, 131-34).  For Smith, the 
higher perspective gives aesthetic satisfactions that nullify the emotional 
disturbances of what from a more mundane perspective are patent injustices.  
Appeal to the invisible hand thus puts one in a philosophical frame of mind 
as that term was meant in the 18th century.  It is the same perspective that 
Kant, who prided himself on being a good reader of Scottish philosophical 
texts, took in his pragmatic essays.   
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Church, that rulers, merchants, and other powerful people should explicitly 
aim at the common good.  The old scholastic argument had it that they 
should do so because good social consequences are generally correlated with 
the well-informed and well-meant intentions of rulers.  Smith denies it.  He 
tells his intended audience, which includes people who make policy as well 
as the clerical and learned professionals who are in a position to influence 
them, that “by pursuing his own interest [a rich or influential person] 
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really 
intends to promote it” (Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter II, Paragraph 
IX).     
Smith, then, is against old common-good argument.  He takes a much 
more jaundiced view of people in power than the tradition.  He thinks that 
cabals, combinations, and corporations of rich and leisured people, and a 
fortiori of political parties and governments, invariably obstruct the optimal 
flow of economic interaction among individuals, rich and poor, and are 
bound to do so even if the rich actually do condescend now and then out of 
genuine good will to support the poor in their poverty.  Such hands are very 
visible and very heavy.   They cannot help but corrupt government.  So it is 
best to leave things alone, laissez-faire.  Contrary to the legend, however, 
this is not because markets always find the best solution.  The solutions they 
find are only said to be better than good intentions of the Speenhamland sort.  
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They are only “more effectual.”  Nor does Smith say that even this is always 
the case.  The use of the word “frequently” in his sole mention of the 
invisible hand in the Wealth of Nations shows that there are exceptions—
such as the exception that is our subject.  
What tells most strongly against the legend of Adam Smith, however, 
is the real Smith’s reason for thinking that an invisible hand is generally 
better.  We have seen that, contrary to ancient and medieval theory, Smith 
thinks that the virtues of self-control, prudence, and benevolence are too 
scarce among hereditary rulers to support intentional pursuit of the common 
good.  But he also thinks that these virtues are widely distributed among 
laboring people.  On this view, the author of the Wealth of Nations, a former 
professional professor of moral philosophy, was as much a virtue theorist as 
Aristotle (McCloskey, 2004).  But he turned classical and scholastic 
Aristotelian virtue theory, and its economics with it, on its head.   He 
rejected the old assumption that ordinary people lack the moral and 
intellectual capacities or virtue-building experiences of their supposed 
betters.  “Smith,” writes Samuel Fleishacker, among scholars Smith’s most 
careful reader, “is reluctant to acknowledge that the division of labor is 
based to any significant degree on differences in talents … [A] dignified 
picture of the poor is … [his] most novel contribution in the Wealth of 
Nations” (Fleishacker, 2004, 208).   There is not nearly as much difference 
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between the populist poet Robert Burns and Professor Smith as one might 
think. 
Accordingly, we do not find in Wealth of Nations anything like the 
defense of global free trade or of general economic equilibrium that we 
would expect from the Smith of legend.   If an invisible hand is at work 
when domestic industries are politically protected we can hardly be 
witnessing a commendation of free trade ideology as the sole condition in 
which a hidden hand does its happy work.   The sole reference to the 
invisible hand in the Wealth of Nations flies directly in the face of that 
ideology.     
Even so, there is enough self-interest in Smith’s appeal to the invisible 
hand to pose a problem, or at least an apparent problem, when we look at his 
work as a whole.  As a professional moral philosopher in Scottish 
universities that were looking outward to the improving society of which 
they were a part—by teaching and publishing in English, for example 
(Herman, 2004)--Smith, following his teacher Francis Hutcheson, took 
ethics to be coeval with an acquired ability to adopt the position of a  
“disinterested” (which doesn’t at all mean uninterested) observer of own 
actions.  In effect, this means seeing oneself from another’s point of view.  
When we do we are ashamed of looking bad and pleased to look good.  This 
ability and this motivation, Smith argues, constitute a powerful stimulus to 
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virtuous acts and to the virtuous dispositions that grow from them.   It is not 
odd that Smith should have written a treatise on ethics, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, as well as a treatise on economics, the Wealth of Nations.  It still 
fell to moral philosophers in those days to deal not only with personal ethics, 
but also with politics and economics.  Nonetheless, is there not a tension 
between the other-oriented ethics of Smith’s The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments and his self-interested economics of The Wealth of Nations?  Is 
that because after 1762 he quit his teaching job and encountered “the real 
world?” 
The answer, once we consider what we have already discovered about 
Smith, is no.  The perspective from which he gives economic advice is not 
that of a worldly man or of an abstract science of economics modeled on 
Newtonian mechanics, which makes the invisible hand analogous to the law 
of gravity.  It is still that of a moral philosopher who, like Aristotle, treats of 
economics and politics from the perspective of justice, distributive justice in 
the case of economics, retributive in the case of politics. What Smith broke 
with, and broke strongly, was Aristotle’s marked non-egalitarianism.    
Smith does so in part by carefully examining so pervasive and simple 
a phenomenon as exchange.  He famously wrote in the Wealth of Nations 
that “We do not expect our dinner from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker, but from their regard to the their own self-interest.”  
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Still, agents with interacting self-interests must in the every act of voluntary 
exchange show enough sympathetic imagination to judge what the buyer 
wants and what the seller can be expected to ask for it.  Thus exchange does 
depend after all on buyers and sellers putting themselves into each others’ 
shoes--well enough, at least, to know what the other wants, and to know, 
too, how to persuade him or her that one has what is wanted at a price on 
which they might agree.   So there is no conflict between Smith’s two books.   
Not only is there no contradiction between them, but in the act of 
exchange we also see a key source of the presumptive virtue of ordinary 
people that is the linchpin of Smith’s argument.  The results of exchange 
considered as an interpersonal act of communication reverberate each day 
through an entire interacting community in ways that are generally good for 
all.   If Smith, unlike the Smith of legend, does not describe this 
reverberation as the working of an invisible hand, it is because he does not 
see in the scene of exchange anything like the vices of powerful people 
being redeemed in spite of themselves by good, but unintended 
consequences.  On the contrary, he sees exchange itself as communicative 
action that constitutes a powerful school of virtue for the great mass of men 
and women.   
This point has been stressed by McCloskey, who finds in Smith not 
only a full-blown, if bourgeois, virtue theorist, but, like Aristotle, an 
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economic theorist who takes it for granted that economic transactions are 
crucially interpersonal communications rather than mathematical deductions 
(McCloskey, 2004).  This perception has political implications.  Smith saw 
that if exchange is to ripple through a political community in a way that 
increasingly benefits the whole, it has to take place among people 
sufficiently egalitarian in their cultural assumptions to be attuned, more 
through their “sentiments” than their rational economic calculations, to the 
lived world of those with whom they share a common fate.  Exchange takes 
place most effectively, then, in a community of relative equals.  Moreover, 
the more pervasive and unrigged exchange is the more it helps brings into 
existence and sustain just such communities.    
It is this observation that makes it possible for Fleischaker to have 
shown convincingly why, far from leaving everyone to the mercies of the 
free market, the real Adam Smith was willing to support some tariffs, to urge 
national expenditure on infrastructure, to require government to lighten the 
burdens of the laboring poor in circumstances when necessity presses, and at 
the same time categorically to oppose any policies that allow the rich and 
powerful to collude with one another against the poor (Fleishacker, 2004a).  
If Smith adopted what today is called a “preferential option for the poor,” he 
did so by appealing to the traditional, Aristotelian conception of distributive 
justice (Fleishacker, 2004b, 2004a).  The point is not that the poor qua poor 
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have a basic human right to some of what the rich own.  Nor is it to inflame 
the poor to revolt by claiming that property is theft, as Burke and Pitt feared.  
It is that, as for Aristotle, distributive justice means setting up and sustaining 
a socio-political system that shares a community’s store of social goods, 
including honor as much as fair wages, on the basis of merit.  The test of fair 
exchange for Smith, as for Aristotle, is that it preserves the social 
relationships in which it occurs (Nicomachean Ethics V.3.1131a-31b).   The 
difference is that, pace Aristotle, ordinary working stiffs are by this measure 
as presumptively meritorious as anyone else, if not more so.  That is 
decidedly not an Aristotelian conclusion.  Although Smith himself did not 
see this, it is also potentially republican and democratic, as the rapid co-
expansion of economic liberty and political equality in post-revolutionary 
America shows.  
   
Edmund Burke’s Sublime Politics  
  
Edmund Burke will seem an unlikely fan of Adam Smith unless we recall 
that he was an intensely Whiggish opponent of a monarchy that he viewed as 
unconstrained by, and hence eager to corrupt, an independent aristocracy 
and a representative Parliament.  Such a monarch, whether Stuart or 
Hanoverian, Burke regarded from first to last as aiming to usurp the 
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traditional freedoms of British peoples.  Accordingly, the Anglo-Irish Burke 
positioned himself outside the existing political system even while he was 
actually well inside it.3   Burke’s famous speeches were, like those of the 
                                                 
3This self-positioning, as well as his defense of the traditional rights of 
British people against a usurping crown, throws light on Burke’s support for 
the American colonies (Burke, 1774, 1777).  Burke thought of himself as an 
outsider to the extent that he thought of the current monarchy much as the 
American colonists did.  He thought of the crown and court as turning a just 
kingship tempered by a strong aristocracy into a tyranny that was abolishing 
all the social differentiations of rank and role on which political freedom 
actually depends.  But at the same time Burke was urging the Americans not 
to depart on the ground that reform of this sort was still politically possible 
and by arguing that the mother county and its colonies are tied by bonds of 
tender affection in an almost feminized way (Burke, 1777).   In doing so, 
Burke helped put into circulation important commonplaces of the Whig 
tradition that eventually found their way into the speeches of the American 
Whig Henry Clay, who used them to fight against sectionalism.  Through 
Clay’s speeches, these topoi went into Lincoln’s “mystic chords of memory” 
that bind us together as a people.  Lincoln was a Whig before he was a 
Republican.               ` 
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ancient Athenian Isocrates, intended to circulate among a literate public as 
much as among his constituents and parliamentary colleagues.  Small 
wonder, then, that these discourses were intensely responsive to aesthetic 
norms--so responsive, in fact, that many of Burke’s parliamentary 
colleagues, some of whom were not well educated, regarded them as useless.  
In view of the fact that some of Burke’s speeches are models of public 
address to this day it is hard for us to appreciate that when news spread that 
he was about to rise the benches suddenly emptied.    
As a member of Parliament, Burke made it his business to learn as much 
as he could about economic policy.   “If I had not deemed it of some value,” 
he later said, “I should not have made political economy an object of my 
humble studies from my very early youth to near the end of my service in 
parliament.”  Thus in reading the newly published Wealth of Nations Burke  
understood Smith’s claim that economic activity is not isolated calculation, 
but an interpersonal relationship that depends on communication, trust, 
sagacity, and civility.  When successfully accomplished, economic 
transactions bind people together in ways that collectively taken cement 
larger bonds while at the same time preserving, indeed enhancing, individual 
autonomy.   It is small wonder that Smith saw in Burke a good reader.   It is 
highly unlikely that Burke meant to include Smith among the “sophisters, 
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economists, and calculators” that he denounced in his 1790 Reflections on 
the Revolution in France.  
Still, there is an interesting difference.   Burke’s consciously aesthetic 
rhetoric cultivated a markedly elevated style rather than the plain style 
favored by Scottish writers and rhetorical theorists, Smith included.  (Smith 
wrote a rhetorical treatise in 1762-63 in which he favored the plain style. 
[Smith, 1985).   By contrast, even when he was talking about subjects as 
mundane as taxes and trade, Burke’s was a rhetoric of sublimity rather than 
of the clear and straightforward speech commended by the Scots.  What 
political work, we may well ask, could such a high-flying style possibly be 
doing?  And whatever that work might be could it have inclined Burke to 
draw a different conclusion from Smith about government support for the 
laborers in hard times? 
To discover why Burke cultivated his high style we must go back to 
his younger days as a literary critic.  Having done so, we can then fast-
forward to the scene of revolution and war in the 1790, when Burke opposed 
public subsidies for the poor. 
Burke began his public life in the l750s as a literary critic and theorist.  
He was, like James Boswell, a familiar of the famous circle around Samuel 
Johnson.  He was just as eager as others in that circle to respond to David 
Hume’s skepticism, which attacked the possibility of knowledge in order to 
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place ethical and political life on imaginative and emotional, not intellectual, 
foundations.  I say “respond to” rather than “refute” because the problem is 
that to one degree or another Hume’s most intelligent critics agreed with him 
that reason does not ground what Hume called “common life” (Livingston, 
1984).  It is our moral sentiments that do that.  Their force is self-evident.  It 
is they that exercise the gravitational pull--Hume professed a desire to be 
Newton of social life--that binds us together into community.  Hume’s friend 
Smith shared this view.  So did Thomas Reid.  So did Burke.  But whereas 
Smith and Reid (and even more Kant, who was a careful reader of all three 
authors) resisted Hume’s skepticism, Burke seems to have concluded even 
more strongly than Hume that the emotional and imaginative mechanics of 
common life cannot be correctly described, let alone explained and justified, 
if we imagine that they are in any way rationally motivated or rationally 
grounded.4  
In his 1757, Philosophical Enquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful and 
the Sublime, which develops thoughts acquired during his time with 
Johnson’s circle, Burke argued against the rationalism of the Aristotelian 
                                                 
4I would argue on another occasion that Burke’s suspicion of reason is 
connected with the fact that he addresses us as a rhetorician rather than as a 
philosopher.  See Depew & Peters, 2001 
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account of our pleasure in dramatic representations of unpleasant things.   
The Aristotelian and French neo-classical answer to this old puzzle is that 
the pleasures of tragedy depend on the fact that rationally following their 
narrative logic transmutes the emotions of pity for one who is represented as 
suffering and of fear that it might happen to oneself into an emotionally 
purifying and hence pleasurable form of reflective learning (Nussbaum, 
1986).  Given the moral and political importance Burke assigned to 
imagination, and so to art, as well as his Humean distrust of reason as a 
guide to life, Burke judged this answer unsatisfactory.   It is far better to stay 
at the level of the passions, and to do so by recognizing as a plain fact that 
the fascinated pleasure we take in actually seeing suffering has little to do 
with rationally following the logic of a well-wrought plot.  Burke’s proof is 
the greater delight he thinks we take in actually witnessing suffering rather 
in seeing mere representations of it.  It is well known that people flock to the 
scene of a gruesome accident. 5  When its scale is large and powerful 
                                                 
5The New Yorker reports on the basis of audience interviews that the large 
rise in ticket sales for the accident-prone, because actually life-threatening, 
Broadway production of Spiderman is directly related to the prospect of 
seeing someone injured or killed, an event that can be contemplated with 
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enough, the actually terrible gives us the distinctive pleasure we call the 
sublime--as long as we are momentarily safe from danger and so rid for the 
moment of the fear that blocks the sublime pleasure.  This pleasure, Burke 
argues, is a physiological reaction that binds us in fascination to an object of 
terror.  It is not a reasoned reflection in which we tell ourselves, well, yes, 
that might happen to me so I’d better be careful.  Catharsis, learning, and 
reason have nothing to do with it.  So Aristotle and the French neo-
classicists are dead wrong.   
Moreover, Burke argues that God actually designed us this way so that 
we may more surely reach our end than if our conduct were held hostage to 
such a frail and unequally distributed reed as reasoning power.  Burke says 
that every judgment of the beautiful functionally exists in order the serve the 
propagation of the species through the cultivation of our sociality--even 
Kant, who was horrified by Burke’s reduction of beauty to what he called 
the pathology of sexuality, acknowledged that the beauty of women as they 
appear in public is paradigmatic of all beauty.6  By the same token, Burke’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
relish precisely because it occurs in the experience of an artwork.  “Look 
Out,” The New Yorker, January 17, 2011, 20 
6Kant, I.  1764. Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, 
Section III, Paragraph 1. 
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slightly demented twist on natural theology led him to postulate that God 
had implanted in us a fascination with violent death in order that in the 
pleasurable experience of having momentarily evaded of it we would be 
reinforced to preserve our life in ways that reason seems quite incapable of 
ensuring.  No stronger approbation could be found, I think, of Hume’s 
maxim that “Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions,” or of the 
view that the political functions of art are to intensify and so systematically 
reinforce the passions that bind us to our own life and our “common life” 
with others.   
One cannot imagine Smith saying these things.  Perhaps the reason is 
that Burke lived and worked at the cockpit of hegemonic political power, not 
the middling Scotland where his theory was formed.   If so, we are free to 
note that Burke’s bodily-based, passion-and imagination-centered view of 
morality also has a rather menacing implication.  It suggests that if consent 
to and compliance with the “imagined communities” in which we live with 
others were ever broken, as they might easily be in a society riddled with 
injustice and pretense, skepticism would have not the mild, benign, 
corrective effects that Hume postulated, but would vividly show that 
political power is all power and no politics and that “unaccommodated man 
is no more than a bare-forked naked animal,” as King Lear puts it.     
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Anxiety about this problem gnawed at Burke.  It gnawed at him, for 
instance, in his Whiggish effort to insist that the legitimacy of a state 
ostensibly based on the continuity of its monarchy had not been undermined 
by the rather severe constitutional break of 1688, in which Parliament 
intervened to make William of Orange what amounted to a constitutional 
monarch.  Burke was as eager as other Whigs to suture that fissure before 
anyone could look too hard at it (Burke, 1790, in Kramnick, 421-423).    
Much of the mystification that went into Burke’s elevated style betrayed his 
concern that without making politics sublime the stitching might show.  The 
problem was of special concern to Burke because, in contrast to block-head 
conservatives, there was great tension between his own desire for reform and 
his perception that even the most legitimated political order is in fact nothing 
but a set of conventions and artifices that works only if it appears natural.  
How much reform can the system actually tolerate?  The hyperbolic style of 
Burke’s rhetorical performances can ultimately be traced to the fact that in 
his view only sublime invocations reaffirming what another Burke, the 
rhetorical theorist and critic Kenneth Burke, was to call consubstantial 
identification, could possibly sustain the work of making the conventional 
seem natural by making innovation look like tradition (Burke, 1969).  
  In reflecting on the fact that Burke’s theory of tragedy invites artists to   
raise emotions about violence that usually exist at the boundary of our 
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experience we seem already to have arrived at the theory of politics implicit 
in his rhetorical performances.  Burke’s political rhetoric was focused above 
all on making the state a sublime fantasy, and therefore on making it a 
dangerous and revered object of consciousness.  That, I submit, is why his 
style is so elevated and mystified.  (In his Essay on the Sublime and the 
Beautiful Burke claims that poetic words should not be clear, but evocative.)  
This is a decidedly non-Smithean perspective.  Before passing on to the 
economic consequences of this view of government, however, we might 
pause to acquaint ourselves a bit more with how that theory of government 
works.    
In explicating that theory, I would like to refer Stephen Greenblatt’s 
Shakespearean Negotiations, in which what to the modern liberal mind 
appears puzzling in Shakespeare’s plays, especially in his very dark and 
almost sadistic comedy Measure for Measure, affords a key to the very 
meaning of politics in the ancien regime (Greenblatt, 1989).  Greenblatt’s 
“new historicist” method of reading leads him to see that until very recently 
the very nature of governing was thought to be intimately and inextricably 
bound up with something very much like what we call “the Stockholm 
syndrome,” in which hostages -- Patty Hearst, for example -- bond with their 
captors.  The whole point of statecraft in the ancien regime was to display 
the royal body as a sublime, awe-ful object in spectacles of staged terror, 
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such as the dismemberment of Damien the Regicide that Foucault 
memorably reports in the opening chapter of Discipline and Punish 
(Foucault, 1975).  Such staged and stagy events were often followed by 
seemingly random, unpredictable acts of mercy and forgiveness.   The 
phenomenon, as well as a lifetime’s reflection on it, can be seen in 
Dostoyevsky’s personal experience of just such a mock execution.  My point 
is this.  Because we habitually retrodict onto earlier writers the calculatively 
rational, moderately self-interested bourgeois liberalism into which l8th 
century Whiggism morphed, which intentionally desublimated politics, we 
are insufficiently alive to the fact that for his part Burke was still so pre-
modern that he could not imagine the disappearance of a spectacular 
conception of statecraft even when he clearly wanted to.  Consider in 
evidence the following passage:  
Let us take review of the dungeons, whips, chains, racks, gibbets, with 
which every society is abundantly stored, by which hundreds of victims 
are annually offered up to support a dozen or two in pride and madness, 
and millions in abject servitude or dependence.  There was a time when I 
looked with reverential awe on these mysteries of policy:  but age, 
experience, and philosophy have rent a veil; and I view this sanctum 
sanctorum, at least, without any enthusiastic admiration.  I acknowledge, 
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indeed, the necessity of such a proceeding in such institutions; but I must 
have a very mean opinion of the institutions in which it arises.   
    Given sentiments this complex, how can there be any doubt that the Burke 
who presciently condemned the French Revolution in l790 was 
fundamentally the same Burke who wrote his essay on the sublime and 
beautiful some thirty-five years earlier?  Listen to snatches from the most 
famous passage in the Reflections on the Revolution in France with his 
theory of tragic pleasure in mind:    
It is now sixteen or seventeen years since I saw the queen of France 
… at Versailles.   I saw her just above the horizon, decorating and 
cheering the elevated sphere she had just began to move in – glittering 
like the morning star. … Little did I dream that … that she should 
ever be obliged to carry the sharp antidote against disgrace [a dagger] 
concealed in that bosom.  Little did I dream that I should have lived to 
see such disasters fallen upon her … The age of chivalry is gone.  
That of sophisters, economists, and calculators has succeeded; and 
the glory of Europe is extinguished forever.  Never, never more shall 
we behold that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud 
submission, that dignified obedience, that subordination of the heart, 
which kept alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted 
freedom (Reflections on the Revolution in France, 446)      
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     Here we have an epitome of the aesthetic politics that I have placed at the 
center of the political theory performed in Burke’s speeches — all the more 
heightened by the mixture of sexualized beauty in a social setting and, 
through the image of the dagger, the sublime terror of seeing Marie 
Antoinette’s fate as that of a sort of Damien the Regicide in reverse.  The 
image is sublime insofar as it exceeds the bounds of sense by turning the 
natural – well, seemingly natural – order upside down in ways that, once 
they are upended, preclude any possibility of bringing the world back into 
order.  Never, never, never, Burke exclaims in passage just quoted, echoing 
King Lear.  The cake of custom has been irreversibly cut and eaten.  The 
passage thus re-inscribes the very principles of legitimacy that were Burke’s 
constant preoccupation from the start.  We must keep from going down this 
path, he argues.  Our enemies are  “sophisters, economists, and 
calculators”—he had French reformers in mind mostly--who naively assume 
that government will still be possible once politics has been shown up as 
resting on what Marx, in an allusion to Burke, called the naked “cash nexus” 
that has “drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of 
chivalrous enthusiasm, and of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of 
egotistical calculation” (Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto).    
 We may now return to our original problem.  Burke does not say that 
even in the worse of times subsidies should be withheld from the poor 
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because he believes that a policy of benign neglect will ultimately good for 
the poor, as market ideologists have convinced themselves from the mid 
Victorian to our own times.  Rather, his fear, like that of Adam Smith, was 
about the consequences of turning the state into an economic agent, thereby 
removing the imaginative and emotional conditions under which governance 
is possible at all.  As can be seen in the case of France, this will have the 
effect of demystifying and hence delegitimating not only the monarchy, but 
the state itself.   If the cake of custom on which politics depends is 
irreversibly cut the problem will no longer be the potential starvation of a 
relative few but the reduction of an entire society—a society, let us recall, 
that for Burke will have no rational resources with which to pull it back from 
an entirely bestial existence—to the condition of animals.  Accordingly,  
It is not in breaking the laws of commerce, which are the laws of nature 
and consequently the laws of God, that we are to place our hope of 
softening the Divine displeasure to remove any calamity under which we 
suffer or which hangs over us (Burke, 1795, in Kramnick, 210) 
Behind a sublime state, Burke says, lies a sublime God who can look with 
on death by starvation with the same equanimity that we, having been made 
in his image, look on tragic events reenacted for the sake of a fascinated 
pleasure whose secret spring is self-preservation.  In sum, sublime art, 
sublime politics, and sublime economics are of a piece.   
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Into the Modern Age 
 
In this essay I have argued that Smith’s difference from Burke on 
government-sponsored support for the poor rests not on differing views of 
economics, but on differing views of government.  Once we see this we will 
also see how pre-modern both of them actually were.  We will also see how 
insightful they were about matters toward which we have a certain 
blindness, even a “trained incapacity,” as Kenneth Burke calls it.  
Edmund Burke’s pre-modernism is more obvious.  It is obvious not 
only in his theory of the connection between political legitimacy, display, 
and violence, but in his theocentric imagination.  It is impossible for us to 
read “Thoughts and Details on Scarcity” with any equanimity.  Burke was 
clearly deceiving himself about how the laws of God and the laws of the 
market are connected.  Best to leave God out of it by connecting economics 
as a legitimating discourse with secular, humanistic science, even if the 
underlying “meta-narrative” of modern and modernist science still comes 
trailing at least a few clouds of theological glory.   
This was the program of the middle class post-Malthus reformers of 
Victorian England.  The utilitarians who founded the University of London 
and who wrote for The Westminster Review managed to square the circle by 
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persuading the Victorian public sphere that the market, if left to its own 
devises, will make the problem of distributive justice disappear as well as it 
possibly can.  This belief removed the need for a theodicy and thus left room 
for doing precisely what Burke feared, desublimating the state.   Sober men 
in black suits rather than the motley display of the court took over.  Their 
aim was not to make the state into a corporation, as Burke and Smith feared.  
That is a deviation from free-market principles which, as in Nazi Germany 
and Soviet Russia-- and perhaps even present-day Russia--is always 
accompanied by some degree of re-sublimation.  Rather, their aim was to 
make the state into a protector and guarantor of the principle that private 
persons, groups of persons, and even fictitious persons can own firms and 
operate them pretty much as they please so long as the same right is 
extended to all others.  Families are now treated by states as firms.  This is 
the imaginary, and to some extent real, dispensation under which we have 
lived for almost two centuries.  It is small wonder that its actual working 
philosophy is utilitarianism, most recently seen in risk analysis.  
I cannot say that this program has been a failure.  Under the banner of 
globalization the entire planet is now committed to it.  Governments that 
tried to evade it have collapsed.  Countries that still have a long road to hoe 
can at least look with confidence on a growing number of examples in which 
the prediction of Herbert Spencer that social harmony and individual 
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freedom will be simultaneously maximized by a free market has been borne 
out.    
In this respect we might think that Adam Smith has been vindicated. 
If so, however, it is only the Adam Smith of libertarian legend.  The real 
Adam Smith, if he were to walk among us, would certainly note with 
pleasure the rise in the standard of living.  But he would also note, as would 
Burke, that in spite of our mythical belief to the contrary government has not 
in the least stayed out of it.  Instead it has, with ever accelerating intensity, 
taken a strong hand in actively producing the kind of people who can, as 
disciplined producers and consumers, live in and profit from modern market 
societies.  If Foucault paints a vivid picture of pre-modern states and 
subjects in his Discipline and Punish it was not to offer a contrast with the 
wonderful world of Adam Smith, but with the pervasive entanglements that 
make us all mere nodes through which biopower—actually, Foucault 
generally used the term biopolitique—flows.  Jeremy Bentham, the father of 
utilitarianism, was also the father of the panoptical prison.    
None of this would be a surprise to Edmund Burke.  This defender of 
the body politics of the pre-modern looked at modernity through eyes 
uncannily like those of today’s post-moderns.  If, meanwhile, libertarians 
invoke Smith’s iconic name in the course of urging that the power of the 
modern state be curbed, the fact that this power is always increasing shows 
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the power of the imagination to portray what has, except for a few transient 
moments, never actually existed as a  state of affairs that has been lost and 
needs to be recovered.   State and society as imagined and intertwined by the 
real Adam Smith are worth working for.  They are a modern polis.  But the 
state Smith’s self-proclaimed disciples long for is and always will be a 
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